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Boycotts	are	more	likely	to	be	effective	in	industries
which	are	highly	competitive
One	of	the	most	fundamental	aspects	of	our	market	society	is	that	consumers	should
have	the	ability	to	vote	with	their	feet	and	to	not	buy	certain	products	if	they	do	not	wish	to.
But	when	are	these	boycotts	effective	in	causing	corporations	to	change	their	ways?	In
new	research,	Georgy	Egorov	and	Bard	Harstad	find	that	boycotts	should	be	more
common	and	effective	in	competitive	industries	which	have	similar	products,	such	as	the
oil	industry,	while	in	less	competitive	industries,	government	regulators	may	have	to	step
in	to	settle	issues	and	disputes.
One	of	the	most	fundamental	questions	in	economics	is	how	we	should	determine	which	tasks	should	be	done	by	the
government,	and	what	we	can	leave	to	the	market.	While	traditional	market	failures	are	often	used	as	an	argument
for	involving	the	government,	recent	decades	have	seen	an	increased	role	for	consumers	and	activist	groups	in
pressuring	firms	to	change	their	business	practices.	These	groups	have	been	successful	in	addressing	a	variety	of
concerns	about	business	practices,	ranging	from	environmental	issues,	such	as	water	and	air	pollution,	to	those
based	on	values,	such	as	animal	cruelty,	child	labor,	or	violations	of	privacy.	To	further	their	cause,	activist	groups,
instead	of	lobbying	legislators	and	influencing	regulators	(“public	politics”),	can	run	corporate	campaigns	that	often
involve	boycotts	to	directly	pressure	one	or	several	firms	to	change	their	business	practices	(this	new	phenomenon	is
often	called	“private	politics”).
Perhaps	the	most	famous	and	vivid	example	of	such	a	boycott	is	Greenpeace’s	actions	against	Royal	Dutch	Shell’s
attempts	to	sink	Brent	Spar,	an	obsolete	offshore	oil	storage	tank	in	the	Atlantic	Ocean	in	1995	that	caught	attention
throughout	Europe	and	was	particularly	effective	in	Germany,	where	sales	at	Shell	gas	stations	fell	by	40	percent	at
one	point.	Remarkably,	governments	were	fully	on	board	with	Shell’s	initial	decision,	and	Greenpeace	could	only
succeed	by	turning	to	consumers	and	organizing	a	boycott.	Such	success	stories	raise	a	natural	question	of	whether
activists	and	boycotts	will	replace	government	regulators	as	a	primary	way	to	deal	with	the	negative	effects	of	some
commercial	activities,	because	of	their	increased	ability	to	reach	consumers	through	new	technologies.
Overall,	however,	boycotts	are	sufficiently	rare	(partly	because	many	companies	concede	to	minor	demands	before
activists	can	begin	one),	and	are	not	always	effective	at	achieving	their	stated	goals.	For	every	Brent	Spar	story	there
is	a	Nestle	one:	for	more	than	a	decade	various	groups	in	different	countries	boycotted	Nestle	over	its	practices	of
marketing	infant	formula	to	mothers	in	the	1980s	and	1990s,	with	little	success,	until	in	many	jurisdictions	regulators
stepped	in.	A	natural	question	is,	which	issues,	for	which	firms	and	in	which	industries	are	likely	to	result	in
government	regulation,	in	self-regulation	under	activist	pressure,	or	no	regulation	at	all?
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In	our	work	we	model	the	interaction	of	a	firm,	an	activist,	and	a	regulator;	the	firm	can	impose	permanent	self-
regulation	at	any	moment;	the	government	can	impose	regulation,	and	the	activist	can	initiate	a	costly	boycott	and
possibly	call	it	off.	We	show	that	the	likely	scenario	of	these	interactions	critically	depends	on	the	competitiveness	of
the	industry.	If	the	industry	is	highly	competitive,	then	a	boycott	is	likely	to	be	cheap	for	the	activist	(it	is	easy	to
persuade	customers	to	boycott	the	firm	as	there	are	many	close	substitutes)	and	costly	for	the	firm	(it	operates	at	thin
margins,	and	consumers	that	switched	to	a	competitor	are	unlikely	to	come	back).	Here,	we	would	expect	more
boycotts	and	that	they	would	be	more	likely	to	be	successful.	The	firm	is	likely	to	give	in	with	a	high	probability	and
without	much	delay	during	the	boycott,	and	possibly	will	self-regulate	even	before	the	boycott	materializes.	
Conversely,	if	the	industry	is	not	competitive,	boycotts	are	costly	for	the	activist	and	cheap	for	the	firm	to	endure.	In
these	cases,	boycotts	will	be	rare	and	rarely	successful,	and	the	issue	is	likely	to	be	settled	by	the	regulator.
We	thus	expect	activists	and	boycotts	to	be	common	in	competitive	industries,	whereas	government	regulators	to	be
active	in	regulating	relatively	concentrated	ones.	The	two	examples	above	seem	to	fit	the	pattern:	while	the	oil
industry	where	Shell	operated	is	highly	competitive	(similar	product	and	similar	production	technologies),	Nestle
enjoyed	a	dominant	position	in	food	and	beverages.	The	role	of	industry	competitiveness,	however,	may	explain
more	general	phenomena,	such	as	the	relative	prevalence	of	boycotts	in	the	US	(and	to	a	lesser	extent	the	UK),	as
opposed	to	continental	Europe.	More	often	than	not,	American	firms	operate	in	a	more	competitive	environment,
thanks	to	a	large	domestic	market,	whereas	European	firms	often	operate	in	much	smaller	markets.	Obviously,	in	the
recent	decades	the	market	has	become	much	more	competitive	due	to	European	integration;	however,	differences	in
local	laws,	languages,	cultures	and	preferences	still	mean	that	competition	between	European	firms	is	less	fierce	on
average.	This	difference	in	competitiveness	can	explain	why	boycotts	are	an	“American	political	tradition”	and
“American	custom”.
Some	may	argue	that	not	all	industries	are	more	competitive	in	the	US	than	in	Europe;	a	notable	example	is	the
airline	industry,	which	is	dominated	by	four	major	airlines	(American,	Delta,	Southwest,	and	United)	in	the	US	but	is
much	more	competitive,	with	many	low	cost	airlines	in	Europe.	This	is	a	fair	point,	and	consistently	with	the	theory,
we	seldom,	if	ever,	observe	boycotts	of	airlines	in	the	US.	Even	when	some	stories,	such	as	dragging	of	a	passenger
from	a	flight,	make	some	people	announce	their	intention	to	boycott	the	company,	e.g.	on	Twitter,	such	boycotts
rarely	take	off.	The	airline	industry	is	thus	the	exception	that	fits	the	rule.
This	article	is	based	on	the	paper,	‘Private	Politics	and	Public	Regulation’	in	The	Review	of	Economic	Studies.
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